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BALANCING “PECULIARLY FEDERAL
INTERESTS” AND INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN
CRIMES BY AND AGAINST INDIANS IN INDIAN
COUNTRY
INTRODUCTION
As an indigenous people with their own cultures and systems of
governance in a land “discovered” and settled by European nations,
American Indian1 tribes have created unique problems for those governing
the American continents2 from the earliest days of conquest to the present
time. One of the major problem areas has always been the relationship
between the tribes and the rulers of the colonies and, later, the United States.
This Note examines the issue of federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians against Indians in Indian country.3
In United States v. Wadena,4 the Eighth Circuit held that federal courts
have jurisdiction over violations of all federal criminal statutes of general
applicability,5 even over crimes allegedly committed by Indians against
1. The author acknowledges that some readers may prefer the term “Native American” to refer
to the indigenous peoples of the American continents. After much reflection, however, the author
decided to use the term “Indian” throughout this Note for two reasons. First, most Indians use the
terms interchangeably; and most Indian organizations use the term “Indian” in their titles.
Second, almost all federal law dealing with Indians uses the term “Indian.” Therefore, the use of
the term “Indian” will help avoid confusion.
If the use of “Indian” offends any readers the author sincerely apologizes.
2. This Note, however, will deal solely with Indians in the United states and not with problems
and solutions involving Indians in other countries of North and South America.
3. The term “Indian country” is a legal term often used in United States statutes involving
Indians. It is defined by the United States Code as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term “Indian country”, as
used in this chapter [18 USCS §§ 1151], means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c)
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
4. 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998).
5. Statutes of general applicability are those in which the location of the crime does not
constitute an element of the crime. See Stone v. U.S., 506 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 1974). These statutes
are what most people would consider an ordinary federal statute that simply makes it illegal, or
somehow limits one’s ability, to do specified acts. See id. These laws of general applicability differ
from laws, such as enclave laws, in which the location of the occurrence is an element of the crime.
See id.
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Indians in Indian country.6 The court held that federal jurisdiction existed
despite the fact that the crime at issue was not one of the enumerated crimes
in the Indian Major Crimes Act7 (“IMCA”), which established federal
jurisdiction over Indians for certain major crimes committed by and against
Indians in Indian country.8
In Wadena the Eighth Circuit joined the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
perpetuating a three way split.9 Some circuits find no federal jurisdiction over
crimes by and against Indians in Indian country when the crime is not
enumerated in the IMCA.10 The Second and Seventh Circuits find federal
jurisdiction over non-enumerated crimes only when federal law seeks to
protect a peculiar federal interest.11
This Note demonstrates that the Eighth Circuit is correct and that all
statutes of general applicability apply to Indians regardless of the fact that the
violation occurred in Indian country and that the victim was an Indian. This
Note argues that to promote Indian sovereignty, Congress should enact
legislation limiting federal jurisdiction over crimes by and against Indians in
Indian country to those federal statutes that seek to protect a peculiar federal
An enclave law applies only within a federal enclave. Federal enclaves are areas in which the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction. Examples of federal enclaves include: military bases,
national parks, and federal buildings. In order to prove a violation of an enclave law, it is necessary to
prove that the alleged violation occurred within a federal enclave. There is no violation of an enclave
law if this element is not met even though all of the other elements of a violation may have been
proven. Through enclave laws, the federal government exercises a general police power over the
enclaves that it controls. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1994); Ex parte Gon-Shay-ee, 130
U.S. 343, 352 (1889); United States v. Thunderhawk, 127 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Begay, 42 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1994); Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 1974).
6. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 840-42.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The chapter entitled “Offenses Committed Within Indian Country,” states
as follows:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under
chapter 109A [18 USCS §§ 2241-48], incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this
title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary,
robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to
the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by
Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in
force at the time of such offense.
Id.
8. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 840.
9. See id. at 841.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
11. See, e.g. United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977).
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interest.
Part I of this Note discusses the historical background of federal
jurisdiction over Indians, including the increasing tension between federal
jurisdiction and the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Part II examines court
decisions that form the basis of the circuit split. Part III analyzes the history
of this conflict to demonstrate that the Eighth Circuit’s solution is correct.
Part IV proposes that Congress enact legislation to limit federal jurisdiction
over federal statutes of general applicability in cases of crimes by and against
Indians to those cases in which there is a peculiar federal interest involved.12
I. HISTORY OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS
Some notion of the sovereignty of Indian tribes has existed since the
earliest days of the American colonies.13 Great Britain viewed and treated the
Indian nations as sovereign and independent nations.14 After the
Revolutionary War, the United States followed Great Britain in treating
Indian tribes as sovereign and independent political communities15 and
governing the Indians through treaties.16 While the federal government
claimed jurisdiction over certain offenses committed by Indians against white
12. This Note will not discuss the issue of federal jurisdiction over lesser-included offenses of
the enumerated crimes in the IMCA. See generally Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973)
(holding that when a defendant is charged with an enumerated crime, an instruction on a lesser-
included offense does not infringe upon the jurisdiction of the tribes). Moreover, this Note will not
examine whether or not jurisdiction under the IMCA is exclusive or may be exercised concurrently
with tribal jurisdiction. Finally, this Note will not cover the question of state jurisdiction over crimes
committed in Indian country within the borders of the state. For a general discussion of these issues,
see generally Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal And State Jurisdiction Under
Public Law 280, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1627 (1998); Jon J. Jensen & Kerry S. Rosenquist, Satisfaction of
a Compelling Governmental Interest or Simply Two Convictions for the Price of One?, 69 N. DAK. L.
REV. 915 (1994); Stephen D. Easton, Native American Crime Victims Deserve Justice: A Response To
Jensen And Rosenquist, 69 N. DAK. L. REV. 939 (1994).
13. See Jessie D. Green & Susan Work, Comment, Inherent Indian Sovereignty, 4 AM. IND. L.
REV. 311 (1976).
14. See id. at 320.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 320-22; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 548-61 (1832).  The fact that
the United States viewed the Indians as independent nations and dealt with them through treaties does
not mean that they were treated fairly or humanely. The United States government frequently forced
Indians to sign treaties against their will, or that they did not understand. Moreover, the government
retained the power to ignore or alter its terms when it suited the government. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871). A discussion of
the abuses heaped on the Indian nations by the United States is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead,
this Note focuses on the United States government’s claimed legal framework for handling Indian
affairs and the goals of the government in applying such framework. The author wishes to
acknowledge that such a focus is an oversimplification of reality, for the United States has often acted
outside of the framework it established and often in direct violation of the framework it created when
dealing with Indian affairs.
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persons and vice versa,17 offenses “by Indians against each other were left to
be dealt with by each tribe for itself . . ..”18
The Supreme Court confirmed the notion that Indian tribes were
independent nations in Worcester v. Georgia.19 The Court stated that “[t]he
Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial . . ..”20 Therefore, inherent
tribal powers exist independently of a grant from the federal government.21 It
follows that an Indian tribe retains all self-governing powers unless a treaty
or act of Congress subsumes power.22
Despite this notion of sovereignty, Congress extended federal jurisdiction
into Indian country with the Indian General Crimes Act23 (“IGCA”) in
1817.24 This Act made federal laws applicable to crimes committed in areas
17. See United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916). In Quiver the Court found that the Indian
Intercourse Acts of 1796 and 1802 (ch. 30, § 1-22, 1 stat. 469, 469-74 (1796), ch. 13, § 1-22, 2 stat.
139, 139-46 (1802)) provided for punishment of crimes “by white persons against Indians and by
Indians against white persons, but left untouched those by Indians against each other . . ..” Id. at 604.
See also Green & Work, supra note 13, at 311.
18. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883). See also United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S.
at 602.
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
20. Id. at 559. The Court went on to state that the Indian Nation’s independence was limited only
in its ability to deal with foreign powers. See id. at 559. See also Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat) 543 (1823), in which the Court held that Indian sovereignty was limited such that Indians
could not convey their land to any but the federal government.
21. See Green & Work, supra note 13, at 311.
22. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 146 (1982) (“the majority, paraphrasing
from the dissent, stated that the established views are that Indian tribes retain those fundamental
attributes of sovereignty . . . which have not been divested by Congress or by necessary implication of
the tribe’s dependent status . . .”); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89,94 (8th Cir. 1956)
(“Indian tribes . . . still possess their inherent sovereignty excepting only where it has been specifically
taken from them, either by treaty or by Congressional Act.”).
23. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 1-3, 3 Stat. 383 (1917). The act is alternatively referred to as
the Indian Country Crimes Act. The author will use Indian General Crimes Act [hereinafter IGCA] to
refer to the statute in this Note.
The current statute reads:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who
has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998).
24. See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 363 (1986). The IGCA was later
incorporated into the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, Ch. 161 §25 (4 Stat. 733) and the Act of March
27, 1854, Ch. 26 §3, (10 Stat. 269,270) (1854). See COHEN, supra at 363-64.
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“within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,”25 known as
enclave laws,26 applicable to Indian country.27 The IGCA contained an
exception in which the enclave laws did not apply to crimes committed in
Indian country by an Indian against the person or property of another
Indian.28
Around this same time period, Congress further dominated the Indian
tribes by establishing the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 183229 and the
Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1834 (BIA).30 These and other statutes
“narrowed the Indians’ ability to determine their future, deteriorated tribal
autonomy, and compelled their status of wardship.”31
In 1871, Congress further eroded Indian sovereignty by ending federal
recognition of the Indian nations as independent, sovereign entities for treaty
purposes.32 After the enactment of the statute, Congress began to use its
legislative power to deal with Indians rather than its treaty power.33
Despite the erosion of Indian sovereignty that had already occurred, the
power of the United States to interfere in Indian affairs was still limited. In
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
26. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993) (“The Indian Country Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1152, extends the general criminal laws of federal maritime and enclave jurisdiction to Indian
country . . .”); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975); Acunia v. United States, 404
F.2d 140, 141 (9th Cir. 1968). For a discussion of enclave laws, see supra note 5.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998). The Act also contains exemptions for crimes committed by
Indians in Indian country that have been punished according to the laws of the tribe as well as crimes
over which a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction by treaty with the United States. See id. The exception for
crimes by Indians which have been punished according to tribal law was first included in the 1854 Act.
See COHEN, supra note 24, at 364.
29. See Statute of July 9, 1832, ch. 174. § 1-5, 4 Stat. 564 (1832). The Commissioner was
charged with proscribing and managing Indian affairs. See id.
30. See Statute of June 30, 1834, ch. 162. § 1-4, 4 Stat. 735-36 (1832). Among other duties, the
BIA formed courts of Indian offenses. These courts were American style courts, using American style
laws and legal principles. The judges in the BIA courts were appointed by and responsible to the BIA.
The BIA, therefore, exerted tremendous pressure upon the judges. See generally Warren H. Cohen &
Phillip J. Mause Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818 (1968).
31. Green & Work, supra note 13, at 322.
32. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch.120, § 2, 14, 16 Stat. 566, 570-71 (1871). 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1998).
33. The Supreme Court interpreted the statute to allow all pre-1871 treaties to remain valid. See
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The statute was later amended to reflect this
interpretation. See 25 U.S.C. §71.
One particularly disturbing Congressional power mentioned in the Lone Wolf opinion is the ability
of Congress unilaterally to abrogate a treaty with an Indian tribe. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566.
For excellent discussions of the basis for Congress’ power to enact legislation controlling Indian
affairs, see David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and
Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403 (1994); see also Green & Work, supra note
13, at 311.
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1883, the Supreme Court held in Ex Parte Crow Dog34 (“Crow Dog”), that
federal jurisdiction did not exist over an Indian who had murdered another
Indian in Indian country.35 The Court based its decision largely on the text of
the IGCA, which did not extend enclave law to situations involving a crime
by and against an Indian in Indian country.36 Thus, even though an enclave
statute addressed murder, federal jurisdiction did not exist because of the
Indian against Indian exception to the IGCA.37 The Court held that “to
uphold the jurisdiction . . . would be to reverse . . . the general policy of the
government towards Indians. . ..”38
Many members of Congress disagreed with the decision in Crow Dog
because they viewed the decision as setting Crow Dog free without any
punishment or chance of punishment.39 “[I]n direct response to the decision
. . . in Ex Parte Crow Dog . . .”,40 Congress passed the Indian Major Crimes
Act (“IMCA”).41 In its original form,42 the statute contained seven major
crimes43 over which the federal courts have jurisdiction even when an Indian
34. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
35. See id. at 572.
36. See id. at 570.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 572.
39. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 210 (1973) (citing 16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885)).
Crow Dog was released from custody because of the decision in Crow Dog, and the custom of the tribe
for dealing with a murder was simply that of the blood avenger. Id. “[T]he next of kin of the person
murdered-shall pursue the one who has been guilty of the crime and commit a new murder upon him
. . . .” Id. at 210 (quoting 16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885)). Spotted Tail, Jr., the son of the Indian slain by
Crow Dog, later killed another Indian named White Thunder. See id.
Congress’s and the court’s views of the Crow Dog incident are, however, inaccurate and
ethnocentric. In order for a hunting, migratory people to survive, all of the members had to work
together for the good of all of the people. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE 104-05 (1994).
Therefore, the principal way in which the Sioux resolved criminal disputes was through a process of
reconciliation rather than punishment. See id. After the killing of Spotted Tail, a tribal council meeting
was called and Crow Dog’s people agreed to pay a gift of $600, eight horses, and one blanket to
Spotted Tail’s people. See id. at 110. Such gifts were not “blood money,” but rather an offer of
reconciliation. See id. at 105. The purpose of both the council meeting and the gift was to terminate
conflict and reintegrate those involved into the tribe. See id. at 104. Thus, the case had been settled
according to tribal law to the satisfaction of all involved parties. See id. The killing of White Thunder
by Spotted Tail, Jr. was not a revenge killing. See id. at 133. The killing arose from the same factional
political struggle from which Crow Dog’s killing of Spotted Tail, Sr. arose. See id.
40. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209 (1973).
41. The Indian Major Crimes Act was originally passed in 1885 and is currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1998). See supra note 7 for the text of the current statute.
42. The statute has been periodically revised and expanded so that it now contains 14 crimes.
The current list of crimes includes: “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under
chapter 109A [which deals with sexual abuse], incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault
with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury. . . , assault against an individual
who has not obtained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of
this [title 18 which deals with embezzlement and theft]. . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1998).
43. The original seven crimes were: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson,
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committed the offense against another Indian in Indian country.44
The IMCA acted as an exception to the Indian against Indian in Indian
country exception found in the IGCA. The IMCA exception applied only to
the major crimes enumerated in the IMCA.45 When the IMCA applied, the
crime no longer benefited from the exceptions to the IGCA. Therefore,
federal enclave laws applied and the federal courts had jurisdiction to try the
case.46
Despite congressional attempts to expand federal jurisdiction over Indian
crimes, attitudes towards the Indians relaxed in the early part of the twentieth
century. In United States v. Quiver47 the Court addressed the issue of federal
jurisdiction over an Indian charged with committing adultery with another
Indian in Indian country.48 Adultery was not one of the enumerated crimes of
the IMCA.49 The Court noted congressional history leaving the regulation of
Indian domestic affairs to the tribal customs and laws.50 The Court held that
the enumeration of certain offenses in the IMCA implied an intention to
exclude other offenses.51 Because adultery was not one of the IMCA’s
enumerated offenses, the IMCA did not apply, the Indian against Indian in
Indian country exception to the IGCA did apply, and the federal court could
not try the defendant for this offense.52
Congress shifted towards a policy of allowing more self-government by
the Indian tribes by passing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (1934
Act).53 The 1934 Act gave the Indian tribes the right to adopt constitutions
burglary, and larceny. See Ex Parte Gon-Shay-ee, 130 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1889).
44. In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), the Supreme Court upheld the IMCA as a
legitimate exercise of Congressional power based upon the dependent status of the tribes as wards of
the federal government.
For a discussion of the various claimed bases of Congressional ability to regulate the Indian tribes,
see Williams supra note 33; Green & Work supra note 13.
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1998). For text of the IMCA see supra note 7.
46. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998). For text of the IMCA see supra note 7. For text of the
IGCA, see supra note 23.
47. 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
48. See Quiver, 241 U.S. at 602.
49. See id. For a list of the original crimes in the statute, see supra note 43. For the text of the
modern statute, see supra note 7.
50. See Quiver, 241 U.S. at 602. The Court found that the Indian Intercourse Law of 1796 and
1802 (ch. 30, § 1-22, 1 Stat. 469, 469-74 (1796), ch. 13, § 1-22, 2 Stat. 139, 139-46 (1802)) provided
for punishment of crimes “by white persons against Indians and by Indians against white persons, but
left untouched those by Indians against each other . . ..” Id. at 604.
51. See Quiver, 241 U.S. at 606.
52. See id. at 605.
53. 25 U.S.C. § 476, 478 (1998).
Section 476 reads in part:
(a) Adoption; effective date.
Any Indian tribe shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an
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and by-laws for self-government.54 The 1934 Act increased the ability of the
tribes to govern themselves.55 After passage of the 1934 Act, modern tribal
courts began to replace the BIA courts, leading to more independence for the
Indian tribes.56
Two cases that followed the enactment of the 1934 Act demonstrated
further the Court’s intention to protect Indian sovereignty. First, in Williams
v. Lee,57 the Court stated that absent an express act of Congress, it is
impossible for a non-Indian sovereign to infringe upon the right of Indian
tribes to make their own rules and regulations.58 Second, in Morton v.
Mancari,59 the Court held that it was not unconstitutional discrimination for
the BIA to use hiring preferences because the preferences promoted Indian
appropriate constitution and bylaws, and any amendments thereto. . . 
 (e) Vested rights and powers; advisement of presubmitted budget estimates.
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the following
rights and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject
to the approval of the Secretary; to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with
the Federal, State, and local governments. The Secretary shall advise such tribe or its tribal council
of all appropriation estimates or Federal projects for the benefit of the tribe prior to the submission
of such estimates to the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress.
(f) Privileges and immunities of Indian tribes; prohibition on new regulations.
Departments or agencies of the United States shall not promulgate any regulation or make
any decision or determination pursuant to the Act of June 18, 1934 (25 U.S.C. 461 et seq., 48 Stat.
984) as amended, or any other Act of Congress, with respect to a federally recognized Indian tribe
that classifies, enhances, or diminishes the privileges and immunities available to the Indian tribe
relative to other federally recognized tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes.
 (g) Privileges and immunities of Indian tribes; existing regulations.
Any regulation or administrative decision or determination of a department or agency of the
United States that is in existence or effect on May 31, 1994, [the date of enactment of this Act]
and that classifies, enhances, or diminishes the privileges and immunities available to a federally
recognized Indian tribe relative to the privileges and immunities available to other federally
recognized tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes shall have no force or effect.
25 U.S.C. §476 (1998).
Section 478 reads:
This Act shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians, voting at a
special election duly called by the Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application. It
shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, within one year after Jun 18, 1934, to call such an
election, which election shall be held by secret ballot upon thirty days’ notice.
25 U.S.C. § 478 (1998).
54. See 25 U.S.C. § 476, 478 (1998).
55. See id.
56. See Paul S. Volk, Note, The Legal Trail of Tears: Supreme Court Removal of Tribal Court
Jurisdiction Over Crimes By and Against Reservation Indians, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 247, 255-56
(1984).
57. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
58. Id. at 223.
59. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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self-governance.60 The Court further stated that the previous paternalistic and
dominating approach of the government exploited and destroyed the best
interests of the Indian tribes.61
In 1975, Congress demonstrated its intent to further Indian sovereignty
and self-government by enacting the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Act of 1975 (“1975 Act”).62 Congress stated its purpose in passing
the Act was to reverse the trend of “prolonged Federal domination of Indian
service programs . . . retard[ing] rather than enhac[ing] the progress of Indian
people and their communities by depriving Indians of the full opportunity to
develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-government . . ..”63
Congress further stated that such a trend “has denied to the Indian people an
effective voice in the planning and implementation of programs for the
benefit of Indians which are responsive to the true needs of Indian
communities.”64
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part II of this Note addresses the cases that created the three-way circuit
60. See id. at 553-54.
61. See id. at 553.
62. 25 U.S.C. § 450-50n (1999).
Section 450 of the Act reads:
(a) Findings respecting historical and special legal relationship, and resultant responsibilities.
The Congress, after careful review of the Federal Government’s historical and special legal
relationship with, and resulting responsibilities to, American Indian people, finds that—
 (1) the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served to retard
rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians
of the full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-
government, and has denied to the Indian people an effective voice in the planning and
implementation of programs for the benefit of Indians which are responsive to the true needs
of Indian communities; and
(2) the Indian people will never surrender their desire to control their relationships both
among themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations, and persons.
(b) Further findings. The Congress further finds that—
(1) true self-determination in any society of people is dependent upon an educational
process which will insure the development of qualified people to fulfill meaningful leadership
roles;
(2) the Federal responsibility for and assistance to education of Indian children has not
effected the desired level of educational achievement or created the diverse opportunities and
personal satisfaction which education can and should provide; and
 (3) parental and community control of the educational process is of crucial importance
to the Indian people.
Id.
63. 25 U.S.C. §450 (1999).
64. Id.
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split. Courts find either a (1) narrow, (2) intermediate, or (3) broad basis for
federal jurisdiction over crimes by and against Indians in Indian country.
A. Narrow Basis of Federal Jurisdiction: The Enumerated Offenses
Approach
The Fourth Circuit held that when an Indian commits a crime against an
Indian in Indian country, federal jurisdiction exists only if the crime is
enumerated in the IMCA.65
In United States v. Welch,66 the defendant, an Indian, was charged with
the rape67 of another Indian in Indian country.68 The court reviewed the
history of the IMCA and cited United States v. Antelope69 for the proposition
that when an Indian commits a crime against an Indian in Indian country,
federal jurisdiction only exists if the crime is enumerated in the IMCA.70 The
court found that “Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute . . .”71 and that the “power to punish offenses
against tribal law . . . is an aspect of retained sovereignty . . ..”72 The court
held for the defendant, stating that a case with this “factual predicate73 must
65. See United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1987).
66. 822 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1987).
67. Although rape is one of the enumerated crimes of the IMCA, the defendant was not charged
under the IMCA or the federal rape statute, but rather under the South Carolina rape statute through
the Assimilative Crimes Act. See Welch, 822 F.2d. at 461-63. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1998). For
text of the statute see supra note 7.
68. See 822 F.2d at 461. The defendant in the case was an adult male accused of first degree rape
and sexual offense on a three-year-old Indian child. See id. The defendant was tried and convicted
under the South Carolina state law definition of rape. See id. The elements of the South Carolina
definition of rape are not identical to the federal definition of rape in 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1998). See id.
at 463. There is no federal equivalent to the state law sexual offense charge. See id. Carnal knowledge
of a female under the age of 16 is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 2032 (1998), but this crime is not one
of the enumerated crimes of the IMCA nor is it identical to the state charge. See id.
Part of the problem in this case arose because of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13
(1998). Under this Act, the laws of the state within which a federal enclave is found apply to offenses
within the enclave if there is no federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1998). The Assimilative Crimes Act
is, however, subject to the IGCA and its Indian against Indian in Indian country exception.
For a more complete discussion of the Assimilative Crimes Act, see Note, The Federal
Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HARV. L. REV. 685 (1957); Richard Monette, Comment, Indian Country
Jurisdiction And The Assimilative Crimes Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 269 (1990); Derek P. Radtke, Note,
State Encroachment Into Tribal Sovereignty By Means Of The Assimilative Crimes Act, 19 WHITTIER
L. REV. 655 (1998).
69. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). “Except for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, all
crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within Indian country are subject to the
jurisdiction of tribal courts.” Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643 n.2.
70. 822 F.2d at 464.
71. Id. at 464-65 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)).
72. Id. at 465 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326-27 (1978)).
73. The factual predicate to which the court refers is that the crime was committed by an Indian
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involve one of the offenses set forth in the Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18
U.S.C. § 1153, for the United States District Court to have jurisdiction.”74
The court held that when a crime by and against an Indian in Indian country
is not one of those enumerated in the IMCA, “then the case is to be resolved
by the Indian Tribal Council.”75
B. Intermediate Basis of Federal Jurisdiction: The Peculiarly Federal
Interest Approach
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and possibly the Second
Circuit, have adopted an approach that allows federal jurisdiction over crimes
by Indians against Indians in Indian country even when the crime is not
enumerated in the IMCA, provided the statute seeks to protect a peculiarly
federal interest.76
United States v. Markiewicz77 demonstrates the peculiarly federal interest
approach. In Markiewicz, the defendant, an Indian, was charged with
numerous offenses, most of which were not enumerated in the IMCA.78 The
district court held, like the Eighth Circuit,79 that federal jurisdiction exists
over all federal laws of general applicability, even if the alleged crime was
committed by an Indian against an Indian in Indian country.80 The appellate
court reviewed the IGCA’s application of enclave laws to Indian country,81
against an Indian in Indian country. See Welch, 822 F.2d at 463.
74. Id. at 463.
75. Id.
76. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2nd Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 562
F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. 978 F.2d 786 (2nd Cir. 1992).
The court in this case did not explicitly adopt the interpretation described in this section. See id. at
800. The court used other means for maintaining federal jurisdiction over the case. See id. The court’s
language implies that in future cases in which the court is unable to sustain jurisdiction on other bases,
it will apply the peculiarly federal interest approach to determine if federal jurisdiction can be
maintained. See id. at 799-800.
The Seventh Circuit, however, adopted the peculiarly federal interest approach in United States v.
Smith, 562 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977). The author has chosen to use the Second Circuit’s Markiewicz
decision as the basis for the discussion of the peculiarly federal interest approach because he believes
the case offers a detailed rational look at the rationale behind the peculiarly federal interest test.
Additionally, the Smith decision is complicated by the question of whether, once federal jurisdiction
exists, the federal jurisdiction is concurrent or exclusive. See Smith, 562 F.2d at 458.
78. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 792-93. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to steal tribal
funds, conspiracy to violate the federal antiriot act, violating the antiriot act, conspiracy to violate a
statute proscribing maliciously damaging or destroying a building affecting interstate commerce,
witness tampering, criminal contempt, and perjury. See id. at 795-96.
79. For the Eighth Circuit’s approach see infra notes 101-25 and accompanying text.
80. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 798.
81. The IGCA extended enclave laws to Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998). See supra
notes 23-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of and the text of the IGCA.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p347 note Raymond.doc 09/15/00   4:53 PM
358 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:347
Crow Dog,82 the IMCA,83 and United States v. Quiver.84 The court reasoned
that when viewing the IGCA and the IMCA together, the only logical
conclusion was that “the relations of the Indians, among themselves . . . is to
be controlled by the customs and laws of the tribe, save when Congress
expressly or clearly directs otherwise.”85 The court, therefore, rejected the
approach finding federal jurisdiction for all federal statutes of general
applicability, regardless of the fact that the crime was committed by and
against an Indian in Indian country.86
The court also reviewed the narrow approach excluding all crimes not
enumerated in the IMCA.87 The court reasoned that this approach was more
desirable, but not complete.88 More specifically, the court reasoned that such
a narrow approach was correct in its deference to the Supreme Court’s
statement in Quiver89 that the enumeration of some offenses demonstrates
exclusions of others.90 However, the court in Markiewicz reasoned that this
narrow approach was incomplete and that federal laws of general
applicability should provide jurisdiction over crimes by and against Indians
in Indian country in one general situation91 not enumerated in the IMCA:
when the federal statute implicated “peculiarly federal” interests.92
The court examined legislative history to find support for this approach
and found that while discussing the IMCA, Congress stated that “[the IMCA]
provides for [F]ederal jurisdiction over the 13 enumerated offenses. . .
[j]urisdiction over other offenses rests with the tribe.”93 The report went on to
82. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). For a brief discussion of Crow Dog, see supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. See supra notes 39-46 for a discussion of the IMCA and text of the statute.
84. 241 U.S. 602 (1916). The Court noted in Quiver that the enumeration of certain offenses in
the IMCA carried some implication of the desire to exclude others. See id. at 606. It appears, however,
that the law at issue in Quiver, an adultery law, was an enclave law and not a law of general
applicability. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 842 n.18 (1998). Therefore, the defendant
would have enjoyed the benefit of the Indian against Indian in Indian country exception to the IGCA if
it were not an enumerated IMCA offense. See id.
85. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 798 (quoting Quiver, 241 U.S. at 605-06).
86. See id. at 798-99. This is the broad interpretation discussed in section II.C. of this Note. See
infra notes 102-25 and accompanying text. One of the most recent examples of this approach is found
in Wadena, 152 F.3d 831.
87. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799. This is the narrow approach discussed in section II.A. of
this Note. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
88. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 798-99.
89. 241 U.S. 602 (1916). For a discussion of Quiver, see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying
text.
90. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799-800.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 799 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1038 at 3 (1976)). This quote seems to support the
narrow approach discussed supra in Section II.A. of this Note.
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list exceptions to this general rule, stating that “[t]he second overriding
exception is for crimes that are peculiarly Federal . . . such as assaulting a
federal officer . . . or defrauding the United States.”94
The court then looked to case law to support the peculiarly federal
approach to jurisdiction.95 The court cited favorably the Seventh Circuit
decision in United States v. Smith,96 which explicitly adopts the peculiarly
federal interest approach.97 The court also reasoned that, in United States v.
Wheeler,98 the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the peculiarly federal
approach.99 The court did not apply this approach, however, because it was
able to maintain jurisdiction on other bases.100
C. Broad Basis for Federal Jurisdiction: General Federal Laws
In the broadest interpretation of the applicable statutes, the Eighth,101
Sixth,102 and Ninth103 Circuits all hold that the IGCA applies only to enclave
laws and, therefore, the exception for crimes by and against Indians in Indian
country does not apply to general federal laws. These courts hold that federal
jurisdiction exists over an Indian charged with violating a federal statute of
general applicability in Indian country where the victim was an Indian, even
when the crime is not enumerated in the IMCA. 104
The current number of offenses is 14. See supra note 7 for the text of the statute. See supra note
42 for a list of the current enumerated crimes.
94. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1038, at 3 (1976)).
The first exception relates to Public Law 280, which is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra
note 12.
95. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 800.
96. 562 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977).
97. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 800.
98. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
99. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 800 (citing 435 U.S. 313). The Wheeler court did not explicitly
adopt or apply the peculiarly federal approach because it maintained jurisdiction on another basis.
100. See id. The court was able to maintain jurisdiction over some charges because the victims
were not Indians and, therefore, the IGCA Indian against Indian exception did not apply. See id. at
800-803. Also, some of the crimes did not occur in Indian country, so the IGCA did not apply. See id.
Finally, all of the crimes committed by an Indian upon an Indian where the crime occurred in Indian
country, were crimes enumerated in the IMCA. See id.
101. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Stone, 112 F.3d
971 (8th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter U.S. v. Stone]; United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983);
Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter Stone v. U.S.]; United States v.
White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
102. See United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1994).
103. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d
1050 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1975).
104. See Wadena, 152 F.3d 831; U.S. v. Stone, 112 F.3d 971; Begay, 42 F.3d 486; Yannott, 42
F.3d 999; Young, 936 F.2d 1050; Blue, 722 F.2d 383; Burns, 529 F.2d 114; U.S. 506 F.2d 561; White,
508 F.2d 453.
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United States v. Wadena105 is one of the most recent cases addressing
federal jurisdiction for crimes neither enumerated in the IMCA nor enclave
laws.106 The defendants in Wadena were Indians convicted of several crimes,
including conspiracy.107 The victims of the conspiracy were also Indians, and
the actions took place solely in Indian country.108 Because conspiracy is not
enumerated in the IMCA, and because the fact pattern triggered the Indian
against Indian in Indian country exception to the IGCA, the defendants
claimed the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over that offense.109
The court noted that the Eighth Circuit had ruled several times before that
the IGCA addresses only enclave laws and that the IGCA exception for
crimes by and against Indians in Indian country does not apply to general
federal laws.110 The court discussed the history of the IMCA and the IGCA
and noted that other circuits express different interpretations of the
statutes.111 The court decided, however, that its broad interpretation was
correct.112
The court looked at the Second Circuit’s particular federal interest
approach,113 but concluded that, despite its possible validity, such an
approach was too difficult to apply.114 The court then discussed the narrow
approach that general federal laws do not apply at all to crimes by and
against Indians in Indian country unless the crime is enumerated in the
IMCA.115 The court stated that while this interpretation may have been
correct at the time Congress enacted the IGCA, the premise has been
discarded.116
105. 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 836-39.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 839.
110. See id. at 840-41.
111. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 841-42.
112. See id. at 842.
113. See id. at 841. The Second Circuit case to which Wadena referred is United States v.
Markiewicz, 978 F2d 786 (2nd Cir. 1992). See supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Markiewicz.
114. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 841. The court said that the approach “is difficult to apply, given
the presumption of jurisdictional authority of Congress to pass federal laws. If Congress passes a
federal act . . . there always exists a federal concern and interest.” Id. at 841 (emphasis in original).
115. See id. at 841-42.
116. See id. (citing COHEN, supra note 24 at 296-97 (1982)). For the earlier view, see Elks v.
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1884) (“General acts of congress did not apply to Indians, unless so
expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.”).
Several Supreme court cases have addressed this issue and reversed the original presumption, that
general statutes did not apply to Indians unless expressly included, to a presumption that general
statutes do apply to Indians, unless expressly excluded. See Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 115-18 (1960); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598,
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The court was also influenced by the fact that “many courts of appeal
recognize that federal courts may enforce general federal criminal laws
against . . . Indians within Indian country.”117 The court felt that general
federal laws applied to Indians.118 And because the IGCA addressed only
enclave laws, the Indian against Indian exception did not apply to general
federal laws.119 The court, therefore, concluded that its original interpretation
of the two statutes was correct and federal jurisdiction exists over all general
federal crimes even if the crime is committed by and against an Indian in
Indian country.120
Despite the court’s decision that its previous broad interpretation was
correct, the court actually looked at the balance between tribal and federal
interests.121 The court decided that “tribal interests do not outweigh the
federal interest in prohibiting . . .” the crimes involved in this case.122 The
court recognized that “[t]here may be other federal-law prosecutions that
would implicate important tribal interests.”123 Despite the court’s rejection of
the peculiarly federal interest test, the court seems to be applying the
peculiarly federal interest balancing test to justify its position.124
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Broad Interpretation of IGCA and IMCA is Correct.
The Eighth, Ninth and Sixth Circuits correctly interpret the IGCA and
IMCA by holding that the IGCA applies only to federal enclave laws and,
therefore, the Indian against Indian in Indian country exception does not
606-07 (1943); Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 295 U.S.
418,419-20 (1935).
117. Wadena, 152 F.3d at 841(8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
One of the weaknesses with this argument is that half the cases cited were Eighth Circuit cases.
See id. This amounts to arguing that the court’s interpretation is right because the court decided it that
way. The court does, however, cite three Ninth Circuit cases and one Sixth Circuit case. See id.
The Court also cited Cohen, supra note 24 at 283 for the statement that when no particular Native
American right is infringed, Indians are subject to general federal laws. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 841.
118. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 841-42.
119. See id. at 842.
120. See Wadena, 152 F.3d at 842.
121. See id. at 842. The court acknowledged that the Indian-against-Indian “in Indian country
exception shows a respect for tribal sovereignty, especially over matters that affect Indians.” Id. The
court also went on to state that “the application of general federal laws to Native Americans in this
case does not implicate the tribal concerns of sovereignty . . . [however,] [t]here may be other federal-
law prosecutions that would implicate important tribal interests.” Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 842.
123. Id.
124. See id.
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apply to federal laws of general applicability.125 Furthermore, these courts are
correct in holding that federal laws of general applicability apply to Indians.
The IGCA extends to Indian country the “general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . ..”126 The phrase “sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States” refers primarily to federal
enclaves.127 Therefore, the IGCA applied federal enclave law to Indian
country.128
At the time Congress passed the IGCA, federal laws of general
applicability did not reach Indians.129 Over time, however, courts have
reversed this view and applied federal laws of general applicability to Indians
unless Indians are specifically exempted from the statute.130
If an Indian defendant is charged with violation of an enclave law, the
IGCA is the basis for the jurisdiction.131 If the crime was one by and against
an Indian in Indian country,132 federal jurisdiction is removed.133 The IMCA
is, however, an exception to the Indian against Indian in Indian country
exception.134 If the crime is an enclave law which invokes the IGCA, and is
one of the crimes enumerated in the IMCA, which revokes the exceptions in
the IGCA, jurisdiction attaches even when the crime was by and against an
Indian in Indian country.135
125. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Stone, 112 F.3d
971(8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Yannott, 42
F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1975); Stone v.
United States, 506 F.2d 561(8th Cir. 1974); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998) (emphasis added).
127. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99,102 (1993) (“The Indian Country Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1152, extends the general criminal laws of federal maritime and enclave jurisdiction to Indian
country . . .”) Id.; See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 842 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975); Acunia v. United States, 404 F.2d 140, 141 (9th Cir. 1968).
128. See Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 102; Wadena, 152 F.3d at 842; Burns, 529 F.2d at 117; Acunia,
404 F.2d at 141.
129. See Elks v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1884) (“General acts of congress did not apply to
Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.”). Id. at 100. See also
Wadena, 152 F.3d at 841.
130. See Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,115-18 (1960);
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 606-7 (1943); Superintendent of Five
Civilized Tribes v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 295 U.S. 418,419-20 (1935).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998). For the text of the statute see supra note 23.
132. Also exempt from the statute are crimes by an Indian in Indian country that has been
punished by the local law of the tribe and where treaty stipulations preserve the exclusive jurisdiction
to the Indian tribe. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998).
133. Id.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1998). For a discussion of the IMCA, see supra notes 39-46 and
accompanying text.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1998).
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If an Indian defendant is charged with a federal law of general
applicability, the IGCA is not invoked.136 Because the IGCA is not the basis
for jurisdiction, the IGCA exceptions do not apply.137 Because the IGCA
exceptions do not apply, the IMCA is not needed to confer jurisdiction over
crimes that would normally be exempted under the IGCA.138 When the crime
is a violation of a federal statute of general applicability, neither the IGCA
nor the IMCA is invoked and there is jurisdiction regardless of who the
violators or victims are.
Therefore, The Eighth, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits correctly interpret the
IGCA and the IMCA by holding that the IGCA applies only to federal
enclave laws and therefore the Indian against Indian in Indian country
exception does not apply to federal laws of general applicability.
B. The Narrow Interpretation of the IGCA and IMCA Is Incorrect
The Fourth Circuit incorrectly held that there is no federal jurisdiction
over a crime committed by an Indian against an Indian within Indian country
if it is not enumerated in the IMCA.139
The Fourth Circuit held that when the crime was by and against an Indian
in Indian country federal criminal jurisdiction exists only over crimes
enumerated in the IMCA.140 The court erred in this case by failing to
recognize that the IGCA and IMCA apply only to enclave laws.141 The court
erroneously applied the IGCA’s Indian against Indian in Indian country
exception to a non-enclave law and held that there was no federal jurisdiction
unless it was one of the crimes enumerated in the IMCA.142 This is incorrect
because the IGCA applies only to enclave laws and therefore IGCA
exceptions— along with IMCA’s exceptions to IGCA’s exceptions— do not
apply to non-enclave law statutes.143
136. See supra notes 126-30.
137. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 842 (8th Cir. 1998).
138. See id.
139. See United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1987). See also notes 65-75 and
accompanying text.
140. See Welch, 822 F.2d at 464.
141. See supra notes 126-30, 136-40 and accompanying text.
142. See Welch, 822 F.2d at 464-65.
143. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p347 note Raymond.doc 09/15/00   4:53 PM
364 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:347
C. The Peculiarly Federal Interest Interpretation of the IGCA and IMCA
is Incorrect
The Seventh and Second Circuits incorrectly adopted144 a peculiarly
federal interest approach.145 This misconception was based primarily on one
line in a congressional report that stated this approach.146 The
misconstruction begins with the incorrect narrow approach applied by the
Fourth Circuit,147 and then adds the peculiarly federal interest test148 to give
the federal courts jurisdiction over Indian against Indian crimes not
enumerated in the IMCA when the statute seeks to protect a peculiarly
federal interest.149 This approach is incorrect because regardless of whether
or not there is a peculiarly federal interest at stake, when a federal law of
general applicability is violated, there is federal jurisdiction regardless of the
identity of the perpetrator or victim.150 Therefore, there is no need to
determine whether or not a federal statute of general applicability implicates
a peculiarly federal interest.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Congress Should Adopt the Peculiarly Federal Interest Test for
Federal Jurisdiction over Crimes By and Against Native Americans in
Indian Country
The assertion that the Indian against Indian in Indian country exception in
18 U.S.C. § 1152151 applies only to federal enclave laws and that, therefore,
federal jurisdiction exists over violations of federal statutes of general
applicability in such situations constitutes an infringement of Indian
sovereignty. Such an infringement of Indian sovereignty is important because
the Supreme Court has ruled that a non-Indian sovereign cannot infringe on
Indian sovereignty without an express act of Congress.152 Congress should
144. The Second Circuit did not expressly adopt the approach, but only cited it favorably. See
supra note 77.
145. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2nd Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 562
F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977). See also supra notes 76-100.
146. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799-800. See also supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
147. This approach holds there is no federal jurisdiction over a crime by and against an Indian in
Indian country unless it is one of the enumerated crimes of the IMCA. See supra notes 139-143 and
accompanying text.
148. See Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799-800.
149. See id.
150. See supra notes 125-41 and accompanying text.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1998). For the text of the statute see supra note 23.
152. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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use this power to return to the Indian tribes jurisdiction over crimes by and
against Indians in Indian country. This return of power would further the
goals of Indian sovereignty and self-government.
During the last century Congress has frequently expressed its desire to
further Indian sovereignty. The 1934 Act153 and the 1975 Act154 both
explicitly state Congress’s desire to encourage Indian self-government. 
Furthermore, Congress has expressed its support of the peculiarly federal
interest approach.155 While discussing the IMCA, Congress stated that “[the
IMCA] provides for Federal jurisdiction over the 13 enumerated offenses.
Jurisdiction over other offenses rests with the tribe.”156 The report went on to
list exceptions to this general rule stating that “[t]he second overriding
exception is for crimes that are peculiarly Federal . . . such as assaulting a
federal officer . . . or defrauding the United States.”157 These quotes lead one
to the conclusion that at least some members of Congress believe,
incorrectly, that the peculiarly federal interest approach is the law today.
The Supreme Court has frequently expressed its support for Indian
sovereignty and Congress’s attempts to protect the sovereignty of the Indian
tribes. In Williams v. Lee,158 the Court stated that absent an express act of
Congress, a non-Indian sovereign’s infringement of the right of Indian tribes
to make their own rules and regulations is not permissible,159 while in
Morton v. Mancari,160 the Court held that hiring preferences in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs designed to further promote Indian self-governance did not
rise to the level of unconstitutional discrimination.161 In Mancari, the Court
further held that the previous paternalistic and dominating approach of the
government was exploitive and destructive of the best interests of the Indian
tribes.162
153. 25 U.S.C. § 476, 478 (1998). See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Indian Reorganization Act. For the text of the Act, see supra note 53.
154. 25 U.S.C. § 450-450n (1998). See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Indian Self-Determination Act.
155. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 799-800 (2nd Cir. 1992).
156. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1038 at 3 (1976)). At the time there
were only 13 enumerated offenses in the IMCA. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1998). The current number of
offenses is 14. Id. See supra note 7 for the text of the statute. See supra note 42 for a list of the current
enumerated crimes.
157. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1038 at 3 (1976)). The first
exception relates to Public Law 280, which is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 12.
158. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
159. See id. at 217.
160. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
161. See id. at 553-54.
162. See id. at 553.
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Congress should enact legislation that would expressly state that federal
crimes of general applicability do not apply when the perpetrators and
victims are Indians and the crime occurred in Indian country. Such legislation
would give the Indian tribes the right to deal with crimes within the Indian
communities in the way that the tribe feels is appropriate. Crimes that are
solely an internal matter would be punishable according to the beliefs,
culture, and customs of the affected Indian tribes. The Indian tribes, as quasi-
sovereign nations, should have the sole power to deal with such crimes when
those crimes do not affect the federal government. In passing such
legislation, Congress can protect Native American sovereignty, a goal that
Congress and the Supreme Court have expressed and supported throughout
the last century.163
The removal of federal jurisdiction over crimes by and against Indians in
Indian country should not, however, be absolute. It is unlikely that Congress
would desire to remove federal jurisdiction over all crimes by and against
Indians in Indian country, especially when there is a peculiarly federal
interest implicated by a statute. Therefore, if Congress enacts legislation to
remove federal jurisdiction over violations of statutes of general applicability
by Indians against Indians in Indian country, such legislation should also
contain an express proviso that grants federal jurisdiction in such cases when
there is a peculiarly federal interest involved.164
Some members of Congress have already expressed approval of the
peculiarly federal interest approach, and even believe, incorrectly, that such
an approach is the law today.165 Unfortunately, such an expression of
approval is insufficient to make the peculiarly federal interest approach the
law, because Congress must expressly and affirmatively state its intention to
affect Indian sovereignty.166 Therefore, in addition to removing federal
jurisdiction over violations of federal general criminal statutes by and against
an Indian in Indian country, Congress should expressly adopt the Seventh
and Second Circuits’ peculiarly federal interest test.
163. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
164. Such legislation should state expressly that the exemption from federal jurisdiction does not
apply if the statute that has allegedly been violated expressly states that it is to cover Indians.
165. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 799-800 (2nd Cir. 1992) (quoting H.R.Rep.
No. 94-1038, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1976)). See also supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
166. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,223 (1959) (stating that only Congress has the power to
infringe upon the sovereignty of the Indian tribes).
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Critics, like those in the Wadena court,167 would argue that the peculiarly
federal interest approach to jurisdiction over crimes by and against Indians in
Indian country is too difficult to apply.168 Such an approach would,
admittedly, be more difficult to apply than the simple approach that is
currently the law169 and the approach that the Fourth Circuit applies.170 The
first problem with this argument is that a rule should not be adopted simply
because it is easier to apply than the alternatives. When the alternative rules
will result in different holdings, the choice of the rule should depend upon
the outcome that is generally desired, not on the convenience to those who
administer and judge.
In this situation, the expressed Congressional intent is to further Indian
sovereignty and self-government.171 The Wadena approach does not further
Indian self-government, but rather severely restricts it.172 The only two
approaches that further Indian sovereignty are the Fourth Circuit’s
approach173 and the peculiarly federal interest approach.174 The Fourth
Circuit approach, however, does not recognize that even though Congress
desires to promote self-governance, situations exist in which Congress still
wants federal jurisdiction due to the peculiarly federal interest involved.175
The peculiarly federal interest approach is an attempt to balance the goals of
Indian sovereignty and protection of peculiarly federal interests. Therefore,
because the peculiarly federal interest approach most accurately furthers
Congresses desire to protect Indian sovereignty, Congress should choose it as
the appropriate method for deciding such issues, regardless of whether or not
it is more difficult to apply than the other possible tests.
Although the peculiarly federal interest approach is more difficult to
apply than the current approaches to the law, it is not impossible to apply.
The approach is simply a balancing test involving Indian sovereignty and
peculiarly federal interests. It is no more difficult to apply than the many
other tests by which the judiciary seeks to weigh and balance various factors
167. 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998). For discussion of Wadena, see supra notes 101-124 and
accompanying text.
168. See id at 841.
169. The approach of the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are the correct approach to the situation
currently. See supra notes 125-41 and accompanying text.
170. The Fourth Circuit holds that there is no federal jurisdiction over crimes by Indians against
Indians in Indian country unless the crime is one of the enumerated crimes in the IMCA. See supra
notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 101-124 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
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or competing interests.176 If the case involved an Indian perpetrator and
victim and occurred in Indian country and was not governed by the IMCA,
the court would begin with the presumption that there is no federal
jurisdiction. The burden would be on the government to show that the statute
that was allegedly violated implicated a peculiarly federal interest. The court
would then decide if a peculiarly federal interest was involved. The alleged
violator should also have an opportunity to show that the peculiarly federal
interest is outweighed by the tribal interest in administering its own justice. If
the court finds that there is a peculiarly federal interest and a tribal interest
involved, the court must then determine which interest dominates. An
important factor in balancing the interests would be the seriousness of the
crimes with which the two sovereigns would charge the violator. If the two
interests are equally compelling, the intention to promote Indian sovereignty
should be supreme and there should be no federal jurisdiction.177
CONCLUSION
The Eighth, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits have all correctly interpreted the
IGCA and the IMCA by holding that the IGCA applies only to federal
enclave laws and therefore the Indian against Indian in Indian country
exception does not apply to federal laws of general applicability, and that
federal laws of general applicability are therefore applicable to Indians.178
Such an approach ignores express Congressional intent to promote Indian
176. The courts use balancing tests in many areas of law. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd.
Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (peer sexual harassment in schools); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295 (1999) (privacy against government interests in searches); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (3 factor test for due process adequacy of administrative procedures); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (balancing state laws local benefit against the burden on interstate
commerce); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(balancing First Amendment interests of a government employee against the state’s efficiency interests
as an employer).
177. The easiest example of this test arises in a case in which an Indian assaults a federal officer
who is an Indian in Indian country. The defendant would establish that he and the victim are Indians
and the event occurred in Indian country. The government would easily establish that protecting
federal officers is a peculiarly federal interest. The defendant could also show that the Indian tribe
would have an interest in preventing and punishing assaults among its members. The court must
balance these two competing interests. In this case, the severity of the crimes would probably be a big
factor. Assuming that most courts would consider assaulting a federal officer a much more serious
offense than a simple assault, most courts would view the balance in this situation in favor of federal
jurisdiction.
178. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Stone, 112 F.3d
971 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Yannott, 42
F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1975); Stone v.
United States, 506 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
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sovereignty and self-government. Therefore, Congress should enact
legislation removing federal jurisdiction over most of the violations of
federal general criminal statutes when the actor and victim are Indians in
Indian country and should expressly adopt the peculiarly federal interest test.
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